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A Game Worth Playing? The Distributional
Effects of Casino Gambling:
An Emphasis on Iowa
Brad Rolling
ABSTRACT. This paper examines the distributional effects of casino gambling, with an
emphasis on Iowa. The casino tax is found to be regressive, and regressivity increases
with increased accessibility to casinos. Prevalence and costs of pathological and problem
gamblers are discussed in detail. Evidence suggesting a positive correlation between
casinos and bankruptcy rates is presented. Overall, it is found that casinos
disproportionally harm poor individuals, non-whites (with the exception of Native
Americans), and those living near casinos. Iowans must understand the equity
implications of casino gambling in order to make informed policy decisions, including the
county referendums in 2002.

I. Introduction
"Americans now spend more on various wagers than they do on theme
parks, video games, spectator sports, and movie tickets combined" [The
Economist, 1999, 27]. The face of gambling in the United States has
changed dramatically in the past twenty-five years, going from
legalization in one state to a nationwide industry. Currently, 48 states and
the District of Columbia allow legalized gambling within their borders,
causing expenditures on gambling as a percentage of personal income to
rise from 0.30% in 1974 to 0.74% in 1997 [Ibid, 27].
As a whole, gambling has won acceptance by a large part of the
American public, and the government has had no small role in this.
Through lotteries and casino-style gaming, state and local governments
can raise revenue and therefore have more dollars to spend on their
constituents. The gaming industry has seen dramatic growth in the recent
past, with 29 states now having some form of casinos within their borders,
compared to only Nevada and New Jersey fifteen years ago.
Since casino gambling is relatively new to most states, many
economists, government officials, and social and religious leaders have
become concerned with its rapid growth in such a short period of time.
How is this boom changing the economic structure of society, and which
income groups are most affected? Gambling may very well have financial
3
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benefits for the state and community, but distributional issues must also
be studied in order to conduct proper policy in the future.
No better state than Iowa exists for studying the affects of the recent
rapid growth in the gambling industry. Iowa has become one of the
premier gaming states with both riverboat and Indian Reservation
gambling. Gambling has become very accessible to residents, and
revenues from casino taxes have soared. However, the landscape of the
industry in Iowa has the potential to change. The state recently placed a
five year moratorium on the expansion and building of casinos in order
to assess the impact of the industry on its economic structure.
Furthermore, voters in counties currently housing casinos will get a
chance to vote on a referendum in November 2002 to discontinue stateallowed casino operations within their borders. Distributional issues must
be explored in order to make an informed decision on policy issues
regarding the fate of the gaming industry in the state.

II. History
Prior to the 1970’s, social stigma surrounded gambling in almost every
state and was illegal everywhere except Las Vegas and Atlantic City. In
1963, the Iowa Supreme Court ruled that some pinball machines
constituted illegal gambling since an extra ball was rewarded on the basis
of an element of chance. This seemingly ridiculous ruling prompted the
repeal of Article III, section 28 of the Iowa Constitution, which prohibited
"a chance for a prize for a price." [Iowa General Assembly, 2000, II: para.
2] This decision and others like it in other states opened the doors for
bingo and other games of chance to spread.
Relaxing of the stigma and negative attitudes towards gambling,
evident in the demand for government-sponsored lotteries and bingo by
nonprofit groups such as churches, prompted the beginning of
commercialized Indian reservation gaming in the 1970’s [Hsu, 1999, 46].
Soon, Native Americans began raising the stakes of their games above
state-regulated limits in order to attract people and raise revenues. A
series of court cases were lost by the states and led to gaming without
regulation on reservations across America. Clearly regulation was in
order, and the federal government soon stepped in.
The Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 emerged as the key federal legislation to
regulate gaming on Indian lands. Section 2701(5) of the IGRA gives the
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tribes “the exclusive right to regulate gaming activity on Indian lands if
the gaming activity is not specifically prohibited by federal law and is
conducted within a state which does not … prohibit such gaming
activity.” The act provided for a means of limited state control and
ensured Indian rights at the same time. The state government must
negotiate in good faith with each tribe to establish a compact concerning
the rules and regulations of the gaming activity to be held on the
reservation.
Iowa abides by the policy set forth in the IGRA in negotiations with
its native tribes. Iowa currently houses three tribal reservations with
casino activities: the Sac and Fox Tribe on the Mesquaki land near Tama,
the Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska near Onawa, and the Omaha Tribe of
Nebraska near Council Bluffs. State compacts have a duration of eight
years before renewal. The state collects no taxes on gambling activities
on the reservation, but collects an annual fee of $30,000 from two of the
three tribes, in accordance with the negotiated compacts [Iowa General
Assembly, 1999, IIC: para. 5-6].
The floodgates for riverboat casinos opened because of the popularity
of Indian gaming. The demand for gambling seemed to be growing, and
thus represented a profitable business venture. People saw the economic
potential of legalized gambling for the state. A state that allowed
gambling could collect a gaming tax and additional sales and income
taxes, but these revenues were not being realized because Indian revenues
were nontaxable. In Iowa, the 1980’s brought an economic recession that
led to farm crisis and a massive shutdown of machinery factories [Hsu,
1999, 71]. The state turned to riverboat gambling in an attempt to boost
river communities, and in 1989 Iowa became the first state to legalize
riverboat gambling. On April 1, 1991, the first riverboat casinos began
operations along the Mississippi River. Illinois and Missouri soon
followed.
The competition for riverboat casinos grew fast and fierce, because
riverboats could relocate with ease to realize better profits elsewhere. Of
the five Iowa riverboats in commission during July 1992, two soon left
the state and another left in April 1993. Iowa was forced to relax its
betting regulations to compete. The maximum $5 bet and a limit of $200
in losses per person per day were abolished, and casinos were allowed to
operate 24 hours a day instead of closing at 2 a.m. nightly.

III. Iowa Revenues
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In the past 15 years, casino gambling in the state of Iowa has become a
booming industry. The state now houses ten riverboat casinos, three
casinos on reservations, and three land-based racetracks and casinos.
Iowans lost a record $879 million at racetracks and casinos in the 2000
budget year, a 10% increase from the previous year [Petroski, 2001, 1B].
Such a large industry can affect the structure of tax revenues in many
ways.
State and local governments in Iowa receive a percentage of each
casino’s adjusted gross receipts, defined as gross receipts of the casino
minus winnings paid out. The state collects 5% of the first $1 million in
adjusted gross receipts of each casino, 10% of the next $2 million, and
20% of any receipts over $3 million, increasing by 2% per year but not to
exceed 36%. In addition, 0.5% of the adjusted gross revenues goes to the
city closest to the casino, and another 0.5% is received by the county.
The Gambling Treatment Fund is to collect 0.3% of receipts [Iowa
General Assembly, 2000, XD - XF].
In Iowa, these revenues have increased tremendously as the gaming
industry continues to boom in the state. As can be seen in Figure 1, state
revenues from all non-Indian casinos skyrocketed from $47.0 million in
1995 to $179.6 million in 2000, a 282% increase over that period.

Source: Iowa Legislative Fiscal Bureau

FIGURE 1. Iowa State Taxes Collected, Non-Indian Casinos
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IV. Tax Incidence Analysis
As tax revenues from casinos continue to rise and become a larger part of
state and local revenue, it is important to understand where these dollars
come from. Specifically, the ultimate source of tax revenue can be traced
back to the visitors of the casino since they directly determine the
casino’s gross revenue. Although gambling is a voluntary activity, tax
money generated by casino revenue can be seen as a personal tax just like
the excise tax on alcohol and tobacco. Many studies have already been
done analyzing state-run lotteries, and have found them to be regressive
taxes. The progressiveness or regressiveness of a casino tax can also be
studied.
Daniel Suits wrote a pioneer study in 1977 on the issue of gambling
tax incidence. Suits surveyed 1736 people in a nationwide survey and
inquired about their gambling behaviors. He found that, as a whole, the
casino tax was income progressive, meaning as income increased, a larger
percent of income was spent on gambling. However, the tax was
regressive for residents of Nevada, the only state that allowed gambling
at the time of the study [Suits, 1977, 27].
The primary findings of Suits are considered by many economists to
be outdated, and irrelevant. One reason is that legalized casino gambling
at the time of the study was limited to the state of Nevada. High travel
costs posed a significant barrier for any low income person to participate
in gambling [Suits, 1977, 28], so the ever-increasing accessibility of
casino gambling warrants new studies. Further, opponents criticize
Suits’s use of a national sample in light of the limited access of gambling.
It is not appropriate to calculate the incidence of a tax in one isolated
community using nationwide data when many people surveyed had never
been to Las Vegas [Borg, et al, 1991, 330-1]. In light of these two
limitations, only the Nevada sample is relevant to the current state of the
industry, and analysis revealed that the casino tax was indeed regressive
for this data.
Borg, Mason, and Shapiro conducted a study without the weaknesses
found in Suits’s work. When their study was conducted in 1991,
approximately 10% of the United States population was within a two hour
drive of a casino (due to the beginnings of gambling in Atlantic City in
1978). The data used consisted of only residents of Clark County,
Nevada and Atlantic City. Two separate regressions were performed for
each locale using first only those who had gambled and then gamblers and
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non-gamblers together. In the regressions, demographic variables
including log of household income acted as independent variables and the
log of the weekly budget used for gambling was the dependant variable
[Borg, et al., 1991, 324].
The results of the study showed that the gambling tax was indeed
regressive. Since a log-linear model was used, the coefficient on the log
of household income variable represents the income elasticity of casino
expenditures. A coefficient equal to 1.0 would signify a proportional tax,
while a number greater than one would imply a progressive tax. In each
of the four regressions, the income elasticity was less than one, meaning
the gambling tax was regressive. Each result was significant at the 10%
level. Take as an example the coefficient of 0.88 for the Atlantic City
data utilizing both gamblers and non-gamblers. This means that as
income rises 10%, a household’s gambling budget increases by 8.8%.
The regression showing the most regressive tax was that of the Las Vegas
combined sample with a coefficient of 0.30 [Borg, et al, 1991, 326].
While the Borg, Mason, and Shapiro study provided a much improved
study compared to that of Suits, it too has its own limitations when used
in the context of the current gambling industry. Most importantly, the
accessibility of gambling venues has exploded since their two city study.
Now gambling sites dot the rivers, Indian reservations and urban areas in
48 states. The majority of the U.S. population is now within driving
distance of a casino.
William Rivenbark conducted a tax incidence study in 1995 that
reflects the current gaming environment. Rivenbark focused on the state
of Mississippi, which has had legalized dockside casino gambling since
1990. At the time of the study, seven counties housed casinos along the
Mississippi River, and one county had an inland casino located on an
Indian Reservation. Rivenbark collected data from people residing in
casino counties as well as people living in non-casino counties by using
a telephone survey.
Rivenbark compared the responses of casino county residents to those
living in non-casino counties. Not surprisingly, residents of casino
counties visited casinos more frequently at each income level but gambled
less each trip. In the case of lower income households (income less than
$40,000), total gambling budget as a percentage of income was higher for
casino county residents than for non-casino county residents [Rivenbark,
1998, 585]. Therefore, accessibility and convenience increases the
amount that lower income households spend gambling.
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Rivenbark conducted a regression analysis to formalize his findings.
Using a log-linear regression similar to that of Borg, Mason, and Shapiro,
he found the income elasticities for both casino counties and non-casino
counties to represent a regressive tax, with values of 0.44 and 0.60, both
significant at the 5% level [1998, 586]. A lower elasticity for casino
counties means that the gambling tax is more regressive in casino
counties, since a value of one would represent a proportional tax.
In all three studies, the more accessible casino gambling becomes, the
more regressive the gambling tax becomes. This provides a dilemma for
states wishing to add tax revenue by allowing construction of a new
casino: the tax hurts lower income households relative to high income
households, and this phenomenon will worsen for each new casino
allowed. This is contrary to the prevailing idea of a “good” tax, such as
the income tax, which is progressive.

V. Demographic Distribution
Each study, Rivenbark’s in particular, also found statistically significant
differences in the tax burden placed on different demographic groups.
In casino counties, Rivenbark reveals that, even within income groups,
non-whites spent 70% more on gambling than whites. He also found in
both casino and non-casino counties that single people spent 95% and
156% more on gambling, respectively, than people who were married.
Finally, as education levels increased, the amount spent on gambling
decreased significantly, ceteris paribus [1998,586]. All of this lends a
new dimension to the debate over casinos for the purpose of collecting
taxes. It appears that state revenues collected from gambling receipts are
funded disproportionally by low-income, less educated, single minorities.
Rivenbark remarks “ if the less educated are being exploited to raise
revenue, then the state has a vested interest in the misfortunes of the poor
and uneducated” [1998, 588].
Native Americans are an exception to the rule when it comes to the
effects of gambling on disadvantaged groups. Native Americans have
historically been one of the poorest and most exploited groups in the
United States, yet the presence of gambling has had an overall positive
impact on the reservations that house casinos. The stated purpose of the
IGRA is to promote “tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and
strong tribal government … and to protect such gaming as a means of
generating tribal revenue” [IGRA, 1988, Sec. 2702]. The act has served
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its purpose - revenues accumulated by tribes have soared since the
passing of the IGRA, increasing from $212 million in 1988 to $6.7 billion
in 1997 [National Gambling Impact Study Commission Report, 2000,
2:9]. However, the regressivity of the gambling tax means that gambling
merely takes from the poor to give to the poorer.

VI. Pathological and Problem Gamblers
When the thrill of the gambling experience and recovering past losses
becomes a dependence or an obsession, problematic or compulsive
gambling is the result. Gambling advocates claim that these cases are few
and limited, stating that only 1% to 3% of the gambling population has a
problem with compulsive gambling [Nichols, et al, 2000, 251]. However,
it has always been difficult to classify what constitutes a compulsive
gambler, and unbiased information has been difficult to find on this
sensitive topic.
The National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago
improved on the way gamblers were classified in 1999 while conducting
research for the National Gambling Impact Study Commission, a federal
report released in 2000. Their new system, the NODS survey system, is
based on 17 items about lifetime behavior and another 17 about behavior
in the past year. NORC defines a problem gambler as one who fits three
or four of the criteria, and a pathological gambler is one who fits five or
more [NORC, 1999, 21]. According to these definitions, although around
14% of all adults have never gambled, 1.2% of the entire adult population
suffers from pathological gambling, and an additional 1.5% are problem
gamblers. A total of 5 ½ million Americans suffer from one of these two
conditions, with an additional 15 million classified as at-risk gamblers
[Ibid, 25].
A detailed look into the demographics of pathological gamblers
reveals even more. Compared to the 1.2% prevalence in the general
population, African-Americans are more than 2½ times more likely to
become a pathological gambler in his or her lifetime, even when
controlling for income level. Those with less than a high school
education as well as persons with an income less than $24,000 also suffer
from the condition at rates above the overall average, ceteris paribus.
Once again, disadvantaged groups are represented at disproportional
rates. Accessibility also plays a role. People living within 50 miles of a
casino are more than twice as likely to become pathological gamblers
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than those living within 250 miles [Ibid, 28].
The losses pathological and problem gamblers accumulate are
staggering. It is difficult to determine an exact monetary value of
gambling losses because gamblers in general tend to overestimate
winnings and underestimate losses. But NORC has estimated that these
two groups alone account for 22.1% of yearly losses to casinos, and 15%
of total dollars lost gambling [NORC, 1999, 33-34]. These figures are
rather large considering that less than three percent of adults fit into one
of these categories.
Losses accumulated by these individuals result in corresponding costs
to society. Pathological gamblers cost America $10,550 over a lifetime,
and problem gamblers cost $5,130. Aggregated, $5 billion per year is
lost, with an additional $40 billion lifetime losses in social services,
creditor losses, and productivity reductions due to missing work, fatigue,
or preoccupation with gambling [NORC, 1999, 52-53]. NORC also
admits that these costs are actually underestimates because they do not
account for intangibles such as the intense family breakdown associated
with compulsive gambling.
Statistics released by the state of Iowa are consistent with the national
figures. “One percent of adult Iowans suffer from severe problems with
gambling and two percent have gambling problems approaching severity”
[Petroski, 2001, 4B]. According to the Iowa Department of Public
Health, 1053 people have received treatment from Iowa’s gambling
treatment program in 2000, an increase of 87% since 1995 [Ibid, 4B].
Many people find the treatment received by gambling treatment
centers to be inadequate or impractical. NORC points out that its societal
cost estimate of $5 billion for pathological and problem gamblers is
dwarfed by cost estimates for other social problems such as alcohol abuse
($110 billion) and smoking ($72 billion). These latter estimates are
dominated largely by treatment costs, while treatment costs for gambling
problems represent only a small portion of costs due to a lack of
availability [NORC, 1999, 53-54]. In Iowa, the dollars allocated to the
Gambling Treatment fund have actually decreased by 14.3% since 1995
[Iowa General Assembly, 2000, XII] even in the face of expanding casino
revenues and increasing demand for counseling. Some Iowans desiring
treatment are discouraged by lack of a nearby site. Others find that their
health insurance will not cover the sessions. The patient is therefore
expected to pay for the counseling sessions, which is implausible given
their financial duress.
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VII. Bankruptcy
Given the regressive nature of the gambling tax and the prevalence of
pathological and problem gamblers, it follows that bankruptcies should
increase. Bankruptcies have skyrocketed since 1985, growing by 277%
nationally from 1985 to 1997 [Nichols, et al, 2000, 247], due in part to the
recent relaxing of laws and social stigma surrounding bankruptcy. Progambling groups such as American Gaming Association (AGA) deny that
the rapid increase in bankruptcies has any correlation with the increased
popularity and accessibility of casinos. For example, Tennessee, with no
legalized gambling and a low unemployment rate, had the highest
bankruptcy rate in the United States in 1996, while Connecticut, with
many types of legalized gambling and a high unemployment rate, had a
very low bankruptcy rate.
However, many factors influence bankruptcy rates, and in order to
study whether or not the presence of casinos affects bankruptcy rates,
these factors must be accounted for. For this reason, a more systematic
analysis of this phenomenon was performed by Nichols, Stitt, and
Giacopassi in 2000. They chose eight counties with a recently opened
casino facility. They then chose, for each of the eight counties, five
similar control counties based on fifteen economic, demographic, and
social criteria. In their study, they found that the bankruptcy rate
increased at a higher rate in the casino county compared to the non-casino
control counties in seven out of eight cases, and the increase was
statistically significant at the 10% level in five of these cases [Nichols, et
al, 2000, 259].
This study included Iowa data. Woodbury County, IA, containing
Sioux City, was one of the casino counties chosen, and Black Hawk
County was one of its five control counties. Bankruptcies in Woodbury
County increased 32.6% over the given time frame, compared to a 16.9%
increase for the control counties, a difference significant at the 10% level.
A detailed breakdown of the Woodbury county results can be seen in the
following table.
Table 1–Percentage Change in Bankruptcy Rate
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Total Bankruptcies
[t-value]

Chapter 7 Filings
[t-value]

Chapter 13 Filings
[t-value]

Sioux City, IA

32.6%

32.5%

35.8%

W oodbury County

[1.85]*

[1.52]

[6.06]***

Control Counties#

16.9%

20.9%

-16.5%

#Control Counties include Chemung (NY), Black Hawk (IA), Garfield (OK),
Daviess (KY), and Ohio (W V)
*, *** represent significance at the 10% and 1% levels, respectively
Source: Nichols, Stitt, Giacopassi, 2000, 255-257

The breakdown of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 filings for Woodbury
County reflects the overall findings of the study. A larger discrepancy
consistently exists among Chapter 13 filings, which involves a repayment
plan for the debt, than among Chapter 7 filings, which involves a
forgiveness of nearly all debt. These results were not as strong as the
authors of the study expected. Because Chapter 7 filings represent a
larger cost to society, they expected a larger and more significant increase
in these relative to Chapter 13 filings [Nichols, et al, 2000, 256].
When considering the equity effects of these findings, however, the
results are striking indeed. When an individual files a Chapter 13
bankruptcy, the repayment plan is in effect for many years, until the debt
is finally repaid. Although this option represents a lower societal cost, it
harms the individual more substantially and for a longer period of time.
If the dramatic increase in Chapter 13 filings is due to the presence of
casinos, then those who file, most likely low income individuals or
problem gamblers, will still face the consequences long after the behavior
has ceased.
Another aspect of financial duress that bankruptcy studies fail to
account for is the handling of personal debt. When a problem gambler
borrows to gamble, they do not borrow solely from corporate agencies
such as banks, credit cards, and insurance and retirement funds. The
individual will also borrow from family and friends with a promise of
future repayment. These lenders are not included in the repayment
agreements of bankruptcy filings and are not compensated unless a
personal agreement is reached. These agreements are never published or
publicized and are very difficult to enforce, especially given the financial
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status of the debtor. Therefore, any attempts to measure the total
financial cost to society of gambling and the resulting increase in
bankruptcies are understatements.

VIII. Policy in Iowa
The most important policy decision in Iowa in the area of casino
gambling will occur during the upcoming general election in November
2002. In the election, residents from each of the ten counties housing
non-Indian casinos will vote on a referendum on whether or not to
continue to allow the casinos to operate within their county borders. A
simple majority vote will decide.
County residents concerned about the plight of low income and
disadvantaged groups in their county should consider voting to disallow
casinos on equity grounds. First, casinos represent a regressive tax.
Though Suits, Borg, and Rivenbark each used a different methodology to
collect data and conduct their regressions, all three studies agree on the
connection between accessibility and regressivity of the tax. Rivenbark
found that residents in casino counties, having better access to gambling
than non-casino county residents, experienced a more regressive tax for
that reason. Casinos not only harm those with low incomes, they also
generate revenues disproportionally from disadvantaged demographic
groups. Second, proximity to a casino increases the chance that an
individual will become a pathological or problem gambler during his or
her lifetime, and many of the same disadvantaged groups have an
increased risk of suffering from a gambling problem. These problems not
only harm the individuals but cost society. Lastly, a direct example from
Iowa showed that bankruptcy rates increased more in a county housing a
casino (Woodbury), compared to demographically similar control
counties (including Black Hawk).
Voters can choose to remove casinos from their county and therefore
eliminate these negative effects. Furthermore, they can do so without
wiping the marginally positive equity effects casinos have had on the
Native American population. The tribal compacts are not part of the
referendum, and by the IGRA, casino gambling cannot be repealed on
reservations unless all similar forms of gambling are disallowed by Iowa
state law [Iowa General Assembly, 1999, IV: para. 4]. The referendum
is a county issue, not a state issue, so voters can vote with a clear
conscience in the best interest of their county without harming the
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economic status of Native Americans.
Other measures have been suggested to alleviate some of the
problems associated with gambling in Iowa, including disallowing ATM
machines in casinos, setting betting limits and single-day loss limits, and
enforcing closing times. These suggestions, however, will be difficult to
pass. All three restrictions were already in place when riverboat casinos
were originally allowed in Iowa, but they were repealed in order to
compete with other states for fear of losing tax revenues. This disturbing
trend of reliance on casino taxes for income is echoed in the National
Gambling Impact Study Commission Report:
In the hierarchy of considerations of state policymakers, the
original arguments in favor of tourism and economic
development have often been displaced by the need to generate
and maintain tax revenues. The various states’ decisions have
been driven to a surprising extent not by a steadfast concern for
the public welfare but by a fierce interstate competition for tax
dollars [2000, 2:7].

IX. Conclusion
Clearly legalized gambling has its benefits and costs. However, it
appears that many of the benefits of gambling come at the expense of
those who can least afford it. Low-income individuals suffer more due
to a calculated regressive gambling tax, and other disadvantaged groups
are harmed as well (with the exception of Native Americans, who have
benefitted from legalized gambling). Those most negatively affected
suffer from severe problems with pathological and problem gambling.
All these things lead to a rise in bankruptcies and other social problems
that harm not only the individual but the state economy as a whole. In
light of this, Iowans should analyze the effects of the huge gaming
industry within the state, and should make informed policy decisions
based not only on tax revenues and perceived economic benefits but also
on the dangerous equity effects of casino gambling.
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